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ENSURING PROPORTIONAL JUVENILE PUNISHMENT: WHY
STATES SHOULD LIMIT JLWOP TO NARROWED FIRST-DEGREE
MURDER
Katie Primatic*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2004, fifteen-year-old Brett Jones killed his grandfather during
an argument about Brett’s girlfriend.1 Brett had moved in with his
grandparents in Mississippi two months earlier, “to escape his
mother[‘s] . . . violent household” and, unknown to his grandparents, his
girlfriend came to stay with him.2 After Brett’s grandfather discovered
this, he ordered her to leave, and an argument and violent altercation
ensued.3 It ended with Brett stabbing his grandfather with a kitchen
knife.4 Brett was convicted of murder and sentenced to life without
parole.5 On appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court opined that as long
as a court “considers a set of youth-related factors,” a sentence of
juvenile life without parole may be imposed without violating the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition on excessive sanctions.6 But most children,
even those who commit grievous crimes, are capable of rehabilitation
and redemption.7
Sentencing a juvenile to life without the possibility of parole,
referred to as JLWOP, is the harshest sentence available to an individual
under the age of eighteen in the United States today.8 In recent years,
* J.D. Candidate, 2022, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2019, The College of
William and Mary. I would like to thank my faculty advisor, Professor Margaret Lewis,
my Comments Editor, Mikayla Berliner, and my mom and dad for their support,
guidance, and willingness to engage in the topic of juvenile justice with me. Additional
thanks to the Seton Hall Law Review editors for their diligent work and thoughtful
recommendations.
1 Brief for Petitioner at 3, Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307 (2021) (No. 18-1259).
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id. at 4.
6 Id.; see U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; Jones v. State, 122 So. 3d 698, 700–02 (Miss. 2013).
7 See Brief for Petitioner at 34, Jones, 141 S. Ct. 1307 (No. 18-1259) (citing
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 212 (2016)); Part IV, infra.
8 See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012).
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the Supreme Court has meaningfully advanced the idea that children, as
compared to adults, are inherently and constitutionally less culpable in
criminal sentencing.9 Yet in the 2021 case Jones v. Mississippi, the Court
articulated that a factual finding of permanent incorrigibility is not
necessary before imposing JLWOP on a juvenile offender.10 The Court
elaborated that this holding does not disturb its prior JLWOP precedent,
which limits the application of the sentence, and that states are not
precluded from imposing additional sentencing limits—like requiring a
finding of incorrigibility.11
But before questioning an individual’s incorrigibility, or an
inability to be rehabilitated,12 a threshold question should first consider
the nature of the individual’s crime. This Comment contends that some
offenses should not reach the question of whether JLWOP is available.
This is partly because JLWOP application has varied among states, with
some states affording less procedural protection for juveniles than
others, rendering disproportionate punishments.13
This Comment argues that states should (1) adopt a categorical ban
on JLWOP sentences for charges less than first-degree murder and (2)
narrowly construe such first-degree murder charges. Adopting this
argument would serve several functions, including aiding states with a
backlog of resentencing hearings, offering more uniform sentences for
similarly situated defendants, creating consistency between the law and
juvenile brain science, and remaining consistent with Supreme Court
precedent holding that JLWOP should be an uncommon sentence
reserved for the rarest of juvenile offenders. Part II of this Comment
discusses the Supreme Court case Miller v. Alabama14 and its impact on
JLWOP sentences in the United States. Part III explores state responses

9 See id. at 465; Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 71–72, 74 (2010); Roper v. Simmons,
543 U.S. 551, 571 (2005).
10 141 S. Ct. 1307, 1311 (2021).
11 Id. at 1321–23.
12 See Casey Matsumoto, “Permanently Incorrigible” Is a Patently Ineffective
Standard: Reforming the Administration of Juvenile Life Without Parole, 88 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 239, 251 (2020) (“JLWOP is barred for all juvenile defendants except for ‘the rarest
of juvenile offenders’ who have committed homicide, whose crimes reflect ‘permanent
incorrigibility’ or ‘irreparable corruption,’ and for whom ‘rehabilitation is impossible.’”)
(quoting Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 208 (2016)); see also Corruption,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); Incorrigibility, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed.
2014).
13 See Alice Reichman Hoesterey, Confusion in Montgomery’s Wake: State Responses,
The Mandates of Montgomery, and Why a Complete Categorical Ban on Life Without
Parole for Juveniles is the Only Constitutional Option, 45 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 149, 161–72
(2017).
14 567 U.S. 460 (2012).
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to Miller and Montgomery v. Louisiana15 as well as national and state
trends in imposing JLWOP, with specific case studies on Michigan and
Pennsylvania. Part IV recommends that JLWOP sentences be limited to
first-degree murder charges, taking Eighth Amendment concerns and
adolescent brain science into account. Finally, Part V shows why states
should construe first-degree murder charges narrowly when
considering Part IV’s recommendation that JLWOP sentences be limited
to first-degree murder charges.
II. JLWOP IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE MILLER V. ALABAMA PRECEDENT
JLWOP is a sentence of life in prison, without the possibility of
parole, imposed on children under the age of eighteen when they
committed their crime.16 Before 2012, these children thought they
would spend the rest of their lives in prison, never having the chance to
demonstrate that they had been rehabilitated for a crime they
committed as a youth. By contrast, other punishments, like a term-ofyears sentence, is a limited and established period scheduled to be
served before juveniles are eligible for parole.17
In Miller v. Alabama, the Court held that “mandatory life without
parole for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates
the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual
punishments.’”18 There, two fourteen-year-old defendants were
convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole under mandatory sentencing schemes.19 The states’
mandatory sentencing schemes prohibited a judge or jury from
considering the juveniles’ youth and attendant characteristics as
mitigating factors or considering whether a lesser sentence, like life in
prison with the possibility of parole, was appropriate.20 The Court saw
fit to categorically ban mandatory JLWOP sentences, relying heavily on
the reasoning of cases like Roper v. Simmons21 and Graham v. Florida.22
Roper, which categorically barred capital punishment for children under
the age of eighteen at the time of their offense,23 established that

577 U.S. 190 (2016).
Juvenile Life Without Parole, RESTORE JUST., https://restorejustice.org/issues-solutions/juvenile-life-without-parole/ (last visited Jan. 4, 2021).
17 See Hoesterey, supra note 13, at 195.
18 567 U.S. at 465.
19 Id.
20 Id.
21 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
22 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
23 Roper, 543 U.S. at 568.
15
16

PRIMATIC (DO NOT DELETE)

934

1/7/22 6:49 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:931

juveniles are constitutionally different from adults for sentencing.24
Graham similarly viewed the characteristics of youth as weakening the
rationale for punishment and rendered JLWOP sentences
inappropriately disproportionate for children who were not charged
with homicide.25
Because the Eighth Amendment guarantees that individuals will
not be subject to excessive sanctions and will receive proportional
punishments for their offenses,26 the Miller Court looked to children’s
diminished capacity and greater prospects for reform and concluded in
both cases that juveniles are “less deserving of the most severe
punishments.”27 The Court reasoned that mandatory sentencing
schemes, which prevent a sentencer from taking into account a
juvenile’s “lessened culpability” and greater “capacity for change,” were
unconstitutional.28 Further, the Court highlighted some key differences
between adults and juveniles: a lack of maturity and an underdeveloped
sense of responsibility; vulnerability to negative influences and outside
pressures; and psychological and brain science developmental deficits,
including a proclivity for risk, transient rashness, and inability to assess
consequences.29
The Court could have banned JLWOP altogether in Miller, which
would have been supported by Roper and Graham as well as recent
findings regarding juvenile brain development that diminishes
penological justifications for juveniles.30 It declined to do so, however,
and instead created five mitigating factors for a sentencer to consider
when determining whether to impose a sentence of JLWOP.31 These,
dubbed the Miller factors, include: (1) the age of the juvenile at the time
of the crime and immaturity; (2) circumstances of the homicide,
including the role the juvenile had in the offense and any influence of
peer pressure; (3) environmental vulnerabilities at the time of the
crime, like an unstable family home environment; (4) evidence or
potential for the juvenile’s rehabilitation; and (5) information around
the original court case, like challenges dealing with police or lack of
participation in court because of the defendant’s youth.32 Though the
Court left the procedural imposition of JLWOP sentences to the
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32

Miller, 567 U.S. at 471 (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 569).
Graham, 560 U.S. at 68, 82.
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see Miller, 567 U.S. at 469.
Miller, 567 U.S. at 471 (citing Graham, 560 U.S. at 68).
Id. at 465 (citing Graham, 560 U.S. at 48, 68, 74, 130).
Id. at 471–72.
Id.
See id. at 477.
Id. at 477–78.
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discretion of the states, after considering these factors, the Court
elaborated:
[W]e think appropriate occasions for sentencing juveniles to
this harshest possible penalty will be uncommon. That is
especially so because of the great difficulty . . . of
distinguishing at this early age between “the juvenile offender
whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity,
and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects
irreparable corruption.”33
Some states have interpreted this, as well as the Court’s emphasis
on requiring the sentencer to take into account how “children are
different and how those differences counsel against irrevocably
sentencing them to a lifetime in prison,”34 as creating a presumption
against JLWOP.35 Presumption or not, the Court outlined that JLWOP
should be a rare sentence because juveniles have a great capacity for
change, and considering youth as a mitigating factor may make a JLWOP
sentence disproportionate to all but incorrigible offenders.36
A narrow reading of Miller’s holding led a minority of states to
conclude that the Court only struck down JLWOP under mandatory
sentencing schemes. Thus, states adopting the narrow reading of Miller
concluded that they could constitutionally impose discretionary JLWOP
sentences at the same rate as they were prior to the decision, so long as
sentencers considered the five Miller factors.37 These states did so
regardless of the Court’s language that the sentence should be
“uncommon.”38 Similarly, they refused to apply Miller retroactively to
individuals who were under the age of eighteen and charged with
JLWOP under a mandatory sentencing scheme prior to Miller—until the
Court reiterated that states were obligated to do so.39

Id. at 479–80 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 573; Graham, 560 U.S. at 68).
Miller, 567 U.S. at 480.
35 Hoesterey, supra note 13, at 164–67 (“Relying on language in Miller . . . state
supreme courts in Connecticut, Iowa, Utah, Missouri, and Indiana all held there must be
a presumption against imposing a life sentence without the opportunity for parole.”).
36 Miller, 567 U.S. at 479.
37 See Alexandra Fahringer, Disturbing the Finality of a Sentence: How States with
High Rates of Juvenile Life Without Parole (“JLWOP”) Responded to Montgomery v.
Louisiana, 70 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 1271, 1278–79 (2018); Hoesterey, supra note 13, at 162–
67; see also JUV. SENT’G PROJECT AT QUINNIPIAC UNIV. SCH. OF L. & THE VITAL PROJECTS FUND,
JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE SENTENCES IN THE UNITED STATES: NOVEMBER 2017 SNAPSHOT 3,
6, 8, 11–15 (Nov. 20, 2017) [hereinafter JUV. SENT’G PROJECT].
38 Miller, 567 U.S. at 479.
39 Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 208 (2016); see also Hoesterey, supra note
13, at 151–52.
33
34
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In Montgomery v. Louisiana—a case where Louisiana denied the
petitioner’s order to correct his mandatory sentence of life without
parole for a crime he committed as a juvenile—the Court clarified that
Miller’s ban on mandatory JLWOP sentences applies retroactively to
convictions that had become final before Miller was decided.40 It held
that the petitioner was entitled to resentencing because Miller provided
a substantive “guarantee” that only juvenile defendants whose crimes
reflected permanent incorrigibility may constitutionally receive
JLWOP.41 States have begun to conduct resentencing hearings, but
because procedural requirements have been left up to the states,
discrepancy remains as to what findings Miller requires for a sentencer
to impose a JLWOP sentence.42
III. TRENDS IN STATES IMPOSING JLWOP
Following the Court’s decisions in Miller and Montgomery, states
have the procedural discretion to implement requirements and
restrictions on JLWOP sentencing.43 Generally, since the Miller decision
in 2012, states’ responses have fallen into three categories: Category 1,
states that have prohibited JLWOP; Category 2, states that have not
banned JLWOP but either have no juveniles currently serving the
sentence or have drastically reduced the number of sentences; and
Category 3, states that have increased or continued use of the sentence.
Section A discusses these three categories post-Miller and Montgomery,
explaining how JLWOP is trending to be less favorable. Section B first
provides specific case studies on Michigan and Pennsylvania, states that
account for a large percentage of JLWOP sentences nationwide, and
ends by showing why Pennsylvania’s procedural safeguards are more
efficient and fairer than those in Michigan.
A. National Trends
Leaving individual states the discretion to procedurally implement
requirements and restrictions on JLWOP sentencing has led to state
disparities in both recommending new JLWOP sentences and
resentencing JLWOP recipients post-Montgomery.44 Since the Miller
Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 208.
Id. at 208–13.
42 See Hoesterey, supra note 13, at 161–72.
43 See Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 206.
44 Hoesterey, supra note 13, 161–72. Resentencing in JLWOP refers to cases
post-Montgomery that now have the opportunity to be heard again before a judge for a
new sentence. Prosecutors may recommend continuing the life sentence, a lesser
sentence, or release, but in any event, prosecutors must abide by the criteria set forth in
Miller.
40
41
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decision, thirty-four states and the District of Columbia have joined
Category 1 or Category 2 by either banning or reducing the imposition
of JLWOP sentences.45 An average of three states per year have
abolished JLWOP since 2013, showing that the country is moving
towards broader rejection of the harsh sentence.46 So far, there are
twenty-five states in Category 1, which encompasses states that have
passed legislation to abandon JLWOP, and nine states that currently
have no juveniles serving such a sentence, which fall into Category 2.47
Even globally, 181 countries have recognized the injustices of JLWOP
and prohibited the sentence for juveniles.48
While twenty-five states—in Category 2 and 3—have not banned
JLWOP, currently, five states account for about 70 percent of all JLWOP
sentences: Pennsylvania, California, Michigan, Florida, and Louisiana.49
This is, in part, because these states imposed strict mandatory
sentencing schemes before Miller—for example, mandating a sentence
of JLWOP to all offenders charged with first-degree murder—and, in
part, due to an unwillingness of these states to apply Miller retroactively
before Montgomery.50 Since Montgomery, an estimated 2,100 formerlyconvicted juveniles serving mandatory JLWOP sentences have become
eligible for a sentencing review, but some states have been more
expedient in their resentencing procedures than others.51
Most states that have reduced their number of JLWOP sentences
have applied Miller broadly, in some cases necessitating a finding by the
judge or jury of incorrigibility before sentencing a juvenile to die in

45 See Josh Rovner, Juvenile Life Without Parole: An Overview, SENT’G PROJECT (May 24,
2021), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/juvenile-life-without-parole;
States that Ban Life Without Parole for Children, THE CAMPAIGN FOR THE FAIR SENT’G OF YOUTH
(Feb. 24, 2020), https://fairsentencingofyouth.org/media-resources/states-that-banlife/; JUV. SENT’G PROJECT, supra note 37; Significant Case Law from Courts Nationwide, JUV.
SENT’G PROJECT, https://juvenilesentencingproject.org/significant-case-law/ (last visited
Nov. 8, 2021).
46 Perry L. Moriearty, The Trilogy and Beyond, 62 S.D. L. REV. 539, 554 (2017).
47 Rovner, supra note 45; Legislation Eliminating Life-Without-Parole Sentences for
Juveniles, JUV. SENT’G PROJECT, https://juvenilesentencingproject.org/legislation-eliminating-lwop/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2021).
48 Juvenile Life Without Parole, supra note 16.
49 State by State Data, SENT’G PROJECT (2020) https://www.sentencingproject.org/
the-facts/#detail?state1Option=U.S.%20Total&state2Option=0 (last visited Nov. 15,
2021) (Juvenile lifers by state as of 2020: Pennsylvania (294), California (224), Michigan
(191), Florida (178), and Louisiana (150)).
50 Fahringer, supra note 37, at 1272; Rovner, supra note 45; JUV. SENT’G PROJECT, supra
note 37.
51 Rovner, supra note 45; Maura Ewing & Samantha Melamed, A Prison Lifer Comes
Home, ATLANTIC (Sept. 15, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2019/
09/juvenile-lifer-comes-home-prison/596845/.
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prison.52 These states have fallen into Category 1 by prohibiting JLWOP,
or Category 2 by having no juveniles currently serving the sentence or
drastically reducing the number of sentences imposed. Mandating an
incorrigibility finding necessarily limits the application of JLWOP
sentences and resentences, leading to a smaller pool of children eligible
to receive the sentence. Some states have also found a presumption
against JLWOP,53 relying on the Court’s language in Miller that the
sentence should be “uncommon” and that youth “counsel[s] against
irrevocably sentencing [juveniles] to a lifetime in prison.”54 All of these
states have seen a decline in their JLWOP populations.55
A minority of states have fallen into Category 3, either by increasing
JLWOP sentences after Miller or consistently recommending or rerecommending JLWOP. These states interpreted Miller more narrowly,
finding the decision only applied to mandatory, not discretionary,
JLWOP sentences.56 Many of these states have declined to recognize that
an explicit finding of incorrigibility is needed before imposing JLWOP
and have similarly declined to recognize a presumption against
JLWOP.57 Prosecutors in these states have continued to seek JLWOP
sentences at a rate that does not reflect the Court’s stated belief that it
should be a rare sentence.58 Such states base these assumptions on one
phrase in Montgomery: that Miller did not impose a formal fact-finding
requirement of a child’s incorrigibility.59 Critics have countered that, in
Montgomery, the Court mentioned eight times that only irredeemable
youth might be sentenced to JLWOP, whereas the Court only mentioned
the formal fact-finding distinction once; therefore, a finding of
incorrigibility by a judge or jury should be required.60

52 See JUV. SENT’G PROJECT, supra note 37; see also Davis v. State, 415 P.3d 666 (Wyo.
2018); People v. Holman, 91 N.E.3d 849 (Ill. 2017); Commonwealth v. Batts, 163 A.3d
410 (Pa. 2017); McGee v. State, No. F-2015-393 (Okla. Crim. App. 2016); State v.
Montgomery, 194 So. 3d 606 (La. 2016); Landrum v. State, 192 So. 3d 459 (Fla. 2016);
Veal v. State, 784 S.E.2d 403 (Ga. 2016); People v. Gutierrez, 324 P. 3d 245 (Cal. 2014).
53 Hoesterey, supra note 13, at 164–66.
54 Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479–480 (2012); Hoesterey, supra note 13, at
164–65.
55 See JUV. SENT’G PROJECT, supra note 37, at 7, 10, 13–14.
56 See id. at 6, 10–12, 15–16.
57 Hoesterey, supra note 13, at 164–66.
58 Id.
59 Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 211 (2016).
60 Hoesterey, supra note 13, at 173–74 (describing how an incorrigibility
requirement is mentioned eight times in Montgomery); see Montgomery, 577 U.S. at 209,
211, 224, 225, 226.

PRIMATIC (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

1/7/22 6:49 PM

COMMENT

939

Although the Court has recently held a formal finding of permanent
incorrigibility is not required before sentencing a child to JLWOP,61
states are free to impose additional requirements to ensure children
whose crimes reflect “unfortunate but transient immaturity” are not
sentenced to a lifetime in prison.62
B. Michigan and Pennsylvania’s Approaches to JLWOP
When comparing how states have responded to Miller, it is helpful
to look at Michigan and Pennsylvania. These states are similar in that
they had a high number of JLWOP sentences before Miller and still do
compared to other states that retain the sentence.63 Combined with
California, these states make up about half of all JLWOP sentences in the
United States.64 Michigan and Pennsylvania differ, however, in their
applications of Miller and Montgomery through legislative response and
resentencing guidelines directed at judges and prosecutors, which have
shown varying levels of effectiveness.65 They also differ in what their
states statutorily describe as constituting first-degree murder—a
mandatory prerequisite to receive a JLWOP sentence in these states.66
These differences have allowed Pennsylvania to effectively move into
Category 2, despite the large number of “juvenile lifers”67 still

61 Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307, 1310 (2021). The Court agreed with the
minority of states that relied on one phrase of Montgomery—that a formal fact finding
of incorrigibility is not required. Id. at 1323. Justice Sotomayor’s dissent thoroughly
details the phrases in both Miller and Montgomery which support the contrary. Id. at
1328–31 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Justice Sotomayor then critiques the Court’s
“mischaracterization” of the one statement the decision rests on. Id. at 1331.
62 Id. at 1315 (majority opinion).
63 JUV. SENT’G PROJECT, supra note 37. Before Miller, Pennsylvania had 525 juvenile
lifers imprisoned while Michigan had 363. Id. at 9, 14. Though today these numbers are
gradually decreasing, other states by contrast, like Missouri, had ninety juvenile lifers in
2012 and have zero today. Id. at 10. Missouri has not formally banned JLWOP but has
passed legislation in 2016 narrowing the range of cases where the sentence may be
available. Id. In 2012, California had 310 juvenile lifers and altogether banned JLWOP
sentences in 2017. Id. at 4.
64 State by State Data, supra note 49.
65 JUV. SENT’G PROJECT, supra note 37, at 9, 14.
66 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.316 (West 2014); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1102.1(a)(1)(2)
(2012).
67 Eli Hager, “Juvenile Lifers” Were Meant to Get a Second Chance. COVID-19 Could Get
Them First., THE MARSHALL PROJECT (June 3, 2020), https://www.themarshallproject.org/
2020/06/03/sentenced-to-life-as-teens-they-fear-getting-coronavirus-before-gettinga-second-chance (using the term “juvenile lifer” to describe individuals who were under
the age of eighteen at the time of their crime that are currently serving life in prison
without the possibility of parole).
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imprisoned, while Michigan has held fast onto Category 3 and appears
reluctant to implement change.68
1. Michigan
Before the Court decided Miller in 2012, 363 people were serving
JLWOP sentences in Michigan.69 This was largely because, at the time,
Michigan’s statutory scheme mandated a sentence of JLWOP to any
individual convicted of first-degree murder, including aiding and
abetting a murder and felony murder, without respect to youth as
mitigating evidence.70 Following Miller, Michigan’s legislature amended
its statute to give courts discretion to sentence juveniles convicted of
first-degree murder to a term-of-years sentence71 or JLWOP, instead of
mandatory JLWOP.72 Further, in both sentencing and resentencing, no
explicit finding of incorrigibility by the judge or jury is needed.73 Today,
it is estimated that Michigan has around 191 juvenile lifers,74 most of
whom are waiting for judicial review.75
Prosecutors have discretion to seek resentencing of JLWOP,
leading to a high percentage of resentencing recommendations
compared to other states.76 As of 2019, prosecutors in Michigan were
re-seeking life without parole (“LWOP”) for nearly two-thirds of

See Fahringer, supra note 37, at 1272.
JUV. SENT’G PROJECT, supra note 37.
70 Fahringer, supra note 37, at 1285.
71 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 769.25 (West 2014). This Comment does not address
lengthy or aggregate term-of-year sentences, which some states have found to be “de
facto” life without parole sentences, triggering the protections of Miller under the
Federal and State Constitutions.
72 JUV. SENT’G PROJECT, supra note 37, at 9.
73 People v. Skinner, 917 N.W.2d 292, 309 (Mich. 2018) (holding that Miller did not
require trial courts to make an explicit finding regarding a child’s incorrigibility, stating
it cannot imagine how a trial court would go about determining whether a particular
defendant is “rare” or not).
74 State by State Data, supra note 49. Since there is no centralized database for
JLWOP statistics, other sources vary in reporting the number of juvenile lifers currently
incarcerated in Michigan. See Allie Gross, More than Half of Michigan Juvenile Lifers Still
Wait for Resentencing, DET. FREE PRESS (Aug. 16, 2019), https://www.freep.com/indepth/news/local/michigan/2019/08/15/juvenile-lifers-michigan/1370127001/
(estimating between 350 and 380); Hager, supra note 67 (estimating 350). However,
for the sake of consistency, this Comment will rely on The Sentencing Project’s
projections, which utilizes the U.S. Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention’s juvenile population data.
75 See Gross, supra note 74; Hager, supra note 67 (discussing fears of juvenile lifers
contracting coronavirus before resentencing).
76 Fahringer, supra note 37, at 1285; Hager, supra note 67 (discussing how a
prosecutor in Michigan advocated that victims and the public should “get priority” over
juvenile lifers).
68
69
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juvenile lifers.77 In Oakland County, defense attorneys sued prosecutors
for recommending resentencing of JLWOP for forty-four out of fortynine juvenile lifers.78 Prosecutors have publicly defended these
decisions, explaining that the juvenile lifers in their jurisdictions fit the
description of a “rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable
corruption.”79 Generally, resentencing in Michigan has been slower than
other states due to “clunky bureaucracy, disagreements over
procedures, and a lack of an official database tracking the process,”80 as
well as prosecutors recommending a high percentage of JLWOP
resentencing.81
In People v. Skinner, the Michigan Supreme Court declined to
require that a finding of incorrigibility was needed before sentencing or
resentencing a defendant to JLWOP.82 The court reasoned that as long
as the Miller factors were considered, a JLWOP sentence was not a
disproportionate punishment.83 The court also pointed out that
Michigan restricts JLWOP to individuals convicted of first-degree
murder,84 which necessarily limits the application of the sentence,
making it “rare” as the language of Miller intended.85 But Michigan’s
first-degree murder statute is not as limiting as the court postulates,
because its language effectively allows children charged with seconddegree or felony murder to receive JLWOP.86 The statute employs a very
broad definition of first-degree murder, including “[m]urder committed
in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, arson, criminal sexual
conduct . . . robbery, carjacking, breaking and entering of a dwelling,
home invasion . . . larceny of any kind, extortion, kidnapping . . . .”87
Because of this, Michigan has a large number of children (and adults)
available to receive life without parole sentences.

77 Gross, supra note 74; The Associated Press, A State-By-State Look at Juvenile Life
Without Parole, SEATTLE TIMES (July 30, 2017), https://www.seattletimes.com/nationworld/a-state-by-state-look-at-juvenile-life-without-parole/.
78 The Associated Press, supra note 77.
79 Fahringer, supra note 37, at 1300.
80 Gross, supra note 74.
81 Id.; Hager, supra note 67.
82 917 N.W.2d 292, 309 (Mich. 2018).
83 Id. at 312.
84 Id. at 313.
85 Id.
86 MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.316 (West 2014).
87 Id. § 750.316(b).
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2. Pennsylvania
Before the Court decided Montgomery in 2016, Pennsylvania had
517 juvenile lifers—more than any other state.88 About 300 of these
juvenile cases originated in Philadelphia.89 After the Montgomery
decision, judges began fast-tracking resentencing hearings of some of
the longest-serving inmates, approving new sentences negotiated by the
District Attorney’s office and public defenders.90 In 2012, Philadelphia
County had almost as many juvenile lifers as the entire state of Michigan
and devised a plan to complete all but ten of its resentencing cases by
the end of Summer 2019.91 When carrying out the resentencing plan,
not a single juvenile lifer in Philadelphia County had been given a new
JLWOP sentence.92 As of 2020, Pennsylvania has cut its JLWOP prison
population down to 294 juvenile lifers,93 and a recent study found that
only 1.14 percent of those released have since been convicted of any
new crime.94
In Pennsylvania, JLWOP sentences are limited by statute to
juveniles convicted of first-degree murder.95 The statute, which only
applies to new JLWOP cases since 2012, abolishes the sentence for
“second-degree murder and gives courts discretion to sentence
juveniles to either LWOP or a parole eligible sentence for first-degree
murder.”96 It also distinguishes between those who were fifteen years
of age or older and those who were fifteen years of age or younger at the
time of the crime.97 The statute defines first-degree murder as a
criminal homicide “committed by an intentional killing,”98 and defines
second-degree murder as a murder “committed while defendant was
engaged as a principal or accomplice in the perpetration of a felony.”99
Third-degree murder encompasses all other kinds of murder.100
In addition to the Miller factors, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
has imposed extra guidelines for a sentencing court to consider in

88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100

The Associated Press, supra note 77.
Id.
Id.
Gross, supra note 74.
Id.
State by State Data, supra note 49.
Hager, supra note 67.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1102.1(a) (2012).
JUV. SENT’G PROJECT, supra note 37 (citing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1102.1(c)).
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1102.1(a)(1)–(2).
Id. § 2502(a).
Id. § 2502(b).
Id. § 2502(c).
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determining whether to sentence a child to JLWOP.101 In Commonwealth
v. Batts, the court created a presumption against JLWOP, which may only
be overcome if the state proves, based on competent evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt, that a juvenile is “entirely unable to change.”102 It also
generated seven factors that a court is required to consider and note on
the record, some of which overlap with the Miller factors, and others
unique to Pennsylvania like “the impact of the offense on the
community.”103
3. Comparing Pennsylvania and Michigan
Unlike Michigan, which gives prosecutors, alone, the discretion to
seek resentencing for JLWOP,104 Pennsylvania supports open
negotiations in resentencing between prosecutors and defense
attorneys.105 If prosecutors seek JLWOP in Pennsylvania, they must
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the offender is beyond
rehabilitation, essentially a finding of incorrigibility.106 Pennsylvania’s
Supreme Court also created a heightened standard of a presumption
against JLWOP and extra factors to consider in addition to the Miller
factors.107 Since these restrictions, Philadelphia’s District Attorney’s
office announced it is not seeking JLWOP for any juvenile sentenced in
Philadelphia County, and since this announcement has found only three
exceptions.108 Dissimilarly, Michigan’s Supreme Court has neither
found a presumption against JLWOP nor required a finding of
incorrigibility before imposing JLWOP.109 This has led to Michigan’s
prosecutors seeking to resentence around two-thirds of its present
juvenile lifer population to JLWOP, instead of a lesser punishment, and
continuously recommending the sentence to newly charged children.110
Though the Michigan Supreme Court emphasized that the sentence
is only reserved for juveniles convicted of first-degree murder,
Michigan’s first-degree murder statute is very broad and encompasses
second-degree and felony murder.111 This allows prosecutors to charge
most offenders, whose crimes resulted in a criminal homicide, with first101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111

See Commonwealth v. Batts, 163 A.3d 410, 459–60 (Pa. 2017).
Id. at 416, 435.
Id. at 418 n.2.
Fahringer, supra note 37, at 1286.
Id. at 1297.
Batts, 163 A.3d at 416.
Id. at 418.
Fahringer, supra note 37, at 1283.
People v. Skinner, 917 N.W.2d 292, 312 (Mich. 2018).
Gross, supra note 74; The Associated Press, supra note 77.
Fahringer, supra note 37, at 1285.
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degree murder. In Pennsylvania, JLWOP is restricted to more narrowly
defined first-degree murder charges, limiting the availability of the
sentence to those children who did not commit an intentional criminal
homicide.112 As a result of these differences, Pennsylvania’s JLWOP
sentencing system is arguably more efficient and fairer than Michigan’s
is currently. In Pennsylvania, juveniles may only be sentenced to JLWOP
after being convicted of first-degree murder, a finding of incorrigibility,
and a defeat of the presumption against JLWOP.113 Michigan offers no
comparable protections.
IV. WHY JLWOP SENTENCES ARE PROBLEMATIC FOR CHARGES LESS THAN
FIRST-DEGREE MURDER
States should limit JLWOP sentences to children charged with firstdegree murder. This argument is not only supported by current
national trends and the Court’s desire to limit JLWOP to incorrigible
offenders to keep the sentence uncommon, discussed above. It is also
supported by juvenile brain development research, discussed below in
Section A. Further, JLWOP is disproportionate and thus in tension with
the Eighth Amendment when issued for second-degree murder or
felony murder charges for juveniles, as explained below in Section B.
A. Juvenile Brain Science Suggests Most Children Are, By Definition,
Not Incorrigible
Though the Supreme Court recently held that sentencers are not
required to make a separate factual finding of permanent incorrigibility
before sentencing a juvenile offender to JLWOP,114 states should take it
upon themselves to recognize that, inherently, because of their age,
most juveniles are not incorrigible and thus should not be sentenced to
JLWOP unless charged with first-degree murder. Children cognitively
think differently than adults and psychosocially lack the developed
social and emotional capabilities that do not form until they mature into
adults.115 Research has shown that juvenile thinking is oriented in the
present and largely overlooks consequences or implications, especially
in stressful situations.116 Other research has shown that juveniles tend
to make decisions based on emotions, such as anger or fear, to a much

18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1102.1(a) (2012).
Commonwealth v. Batts, 163 A.3d 410, 452 (Pa. 2017); see also Fahringer, supra
note 37, at 1283.
114 Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307, 1309 (2021).
115 Victor Streib & Bernadette Schrempp, Life Without Parole for Children, 21 CRIM.
JUST. 4 (2007).
116 Id.
112
113
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greater extent than adults do.117 This largely has to do with the delayed
development of a juvenile’s frontal lobe, a part of the brain that
regulates aggression, long-range planning, abstract thinking, and
perhaps even moral judgment, which does not sufficiently develop until
adulthood.118 The frontal cortex, which controls impulses and risk
assessment, is the last part of the brain to develop.119
Justice Kagan relied on the constitutional distinction between
children and adults to categorically ban mandatory JLWOP in Miller.120
The opinion stated, “transient rashness, proclivity for risk, and inability
to assess consequences—both lessened a child’s ‘moral culpability’ and
enhanced the prospect that, as the years go by and neurological
development occurs, his ‘deficiencies will be reformed.’”121 Taking into
account developmental science when determining proportionality
under the Eighth Amendment is crucial in cases regarding juveniles and
acts as a sound basis for rejecting harsh sentences as excessive.122
The Miller factors take into account these juvenile brain
development considerations by recognizing that youth necessarily
diminishes a juvenile offender’s culpability and by describing age and
potential for rehabilitation as two major mitigating factors.123
Considering the circumstances of the homicide, including the juvenile’s
role in the offense and any influence of peer pressure, is also relevant
since juveniles’ brains are less formed and more likely to be impacted
by societal pressures when compared to adults.124 The environmental
vulnerabilities at the time of the crime, like an unstable family home
environment, mitigate potential penological justifications by
recognizing a juvenile offender’s development may have been stunted
in the not-so-distant past.125 Lastly, the information around the original
court case, like challenges dealing with the police or lack of participation

117 Id. (citing Thomas Grisso, What We Know About Youth’s Capacities, in YOUTH ON
TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 267 (Thomas Grisso & Robert G.
Shwartz eds., 2000)).
118 See Aviva L. Katz et al., Informed Consent in Decision-Making Pediatric Practice,
138(2) PEDIATRICS e1, e7 (2016); Streib & Schrempp, supra note 115.
119 Id.
120 Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471–75 (2012).
121 Id. at 472.
122 Id. at 470.
123 Id. at 477–78.
124 See Katz et al., supra note 118; Streib & Schrempp, supra note 115.
125 ASHLEY NELLIS, SENT’G PROJECT, THE LIVES OF JUVENILES LIFERS: FINDINGS FROM A NATIONAL
SURVEY 2 (2012), https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/the-lives-ofjuvenile-lifers-findings-from-a-national-survey/ (79 percent of juvenile lifers reported
witnessing violence in their homes; more than half (54.1 percent) witnessed weekly
violence in their neighborhoods).
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in court, showcases that juveniles are potentially at a disadvantage in
communicating effectively with their attorneys and court personnel
when compared to adults.126
JLWOP is the harshest sentence a juvenile can currently receive.
Considering the Court’s accepted findings on brain development and the
decision-making capacity of juveniles, it is an inherently
disproportionate sentence for all juvenile offenders except for those
who are incapable of rehabilitation. A finding of incorrigibility may be
a troubling distinction itself that is left up to judges and juries to
determine, and some have argued that no juvenile is unable to be
rehabilitated due to the nature of their youth.127 But decreasing the pool
of offenders eligible to receive a JLWOP sentence can be an effective next
step in diminishing the likelihood of imposing a disproportionate
punishment—especially now that the Court has clarified a finding of
permanent incorrigibility is not required and has extended discretion to
states to impose additional sentencing limits which abide by Miller and
Montgomery.128
B. JLWOP is an Excessive Sanction for Second-Degree and Felony
Murder Charges
The Eighth Amendment guarantees individuals the right to not be
subjected to excessive sanctions and the right to proportional
punishment for an offense.129 In Roper, the Court reasoned that adults
are constitutionally different from children and held that this must be
taken into account to impose a proportional punishment consistent with
the Eighth Amendment.130 The Court held that capital punishment is an
excessive sanction for those under the age of eighteen at the time of their
crime, in part because of juvenile developmental immaturity and the
diminished penological justifications that follow such immaturity.131 It
is well settled that juveniles have developmental immaturity in their
decision making when compared to adults and that “[o]nly a relatively
small proportion of adolescents who experiment in risky or illegal
activities develop entrenched patterns of problem behavior[.]”132

Miller, 567 U.S. at 477–78.
See Hoesterey, supra note 13, at 181–83; Matsumoto, supra note 12, at 253.
128 Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307, 1309–10 (2021).
129 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005).
130 Roper, 543 U.S. at 568.
131 Id. at 569–70.
132 Id. at 570 (quoting Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth S. Scott, Less Guilty by Reason
of Adolescence: Developmental Immaturity, Diminished Responsibility, and the Juvenile
Death Penalty, 58 AM. PSYCH. 1009, 1014 (2003)).
126
127
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Allowing second-degree and felony murder charged juvenile
offenders to receive JLWOP is in tension with the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition on excessive sanctions and is a disproportionate
punishment for juveniles. A charge of second-degree murder is
generally an intentional killing lacking premeditation.133 In some states,
it also encompasses “depraved heart murder,” defined as a killing
caused by reckless disregard for human life.134 Allowing children
charged with second-degree murder to receive JLWOP is problematic.
When charged with a second-degree offense that lacks premeditation or
intent to kill, the child, therefore, did not think through the killing
beforehand. Rather, the child acted out of impulse—something that,
according to brain research discussed above, may be attributable to the
undeveloped brain. Thus, the argument that the juvenile cannot be
rehabilitated is very weak.
Felony murder and accomplice liability traditionally attribute the
death caused in the commission of a felony to all participants who
intended to commit the felony, regardless of whether the participant
killed or intended to kill.135 Depending on the circumstances of the case,
the charged offender may not have pulled the trigger but would be guilty
by association.136 Prior to Miller, an estimated one-fourth of all JLWOP
sentences resulted from felony murder cases or accomplice liability
cases.137 Allowing JLWOP to be available to juveniles who lack
premeditation in the commission of a homicide, or who intentionally
commit a felony but unintentionally become an accomplice to a murder,
is a disproportionate punishment because these juveniles have the
unique ability to be rehabilitated by the nature of their youth and
juvenile brain science considerations.138
Penological justifications do not apply to juveniles charged with
felony-murder.139 Juveniles’ culpability for felony murder charges has
133 40 AM. JUR. 2D Homicide § 41 (2008); Second-Degree Murder, JUSTIA, https://
www.justia.com/criminal/offenses/homicide/second-degree-murder/ (last updated
Oct. 2021).
134 Second-Degree Murder, JUSTIA, supra note 133.
135 Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 491 (2012) (Breyer, J., concurring); Felony
Murder, JUSTIA, https://www.justia.com/criminal/offenses/homicide/felony-murder/
(last updated Oct. 2021).
136 Emily Keller, Constitutional Sentences for Juveniles Convicted of Felony Murder in
the Wake of Roper, Graham & J.D.B., 11 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 297, 312 (2012).
137 The Rest of Their Lives: Life Without Parole for Child Offenders in the United States,
HUM. RTS. WATCH (Oct. 11, 2005), https://www.hrw.org/report/2005/10/11/rest-theirlives/life-without-parole-child-offenders-united-states.
138 See Miller, 567 U.S. at 490–91 (Breyer, J., concurring); Katz et al., supra note 118;
Streib & Schrempp, supra note 115.
139 Keller, supra note 136, at 316.
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been argued to be twice diminished since they are categorically less
culpable than adults, and even adults convicted of felony murder who
do not kill or intend to kill are less culpable than the actual killers.140 So,
“there is no basis for imposing a sentence of life without parole upon a
juvenile who did not himself kill or intend to kill.”141 The doctrine of
felony murder attempts to deter individuals from bringing deadly
weapons if they are planning to commit a crime,142 but juvenile brain
science shows that juveniles, when compared to adults, are reckless,
immature, and impulsive; so any possible goals of deterrence with
regards to felony murder are unlikely to be satisfied.143
C. JLWOP Can Only be a Proportionate Sentence Under the Miller
Factors When a Child Commits First-Degree Murder
First-degree murder charges are a necessary, but not sufficient,
condition for JLWOP. In most states, a charge of first-degree murder
requires a prosecutor to prove the offender acted with both
premeditation and deliberation in the course of the murder.144 If the
prosecutor is seeking JLWOP, the question of incorrigibility should only
be made after determining a juvenile acted with both premeditation and
deliberation during an intentional murder. Premeditation requires the
offender to plan the murder before it was committed, or to think about
the act beforehand, while deliberation requires the offender to be
collected at the time of the offense, or that the offender developed the
conscious intent to kill before committing the murder.145 Thus, the
juvenile who acts with both premeditation and deliberation must have
considered the intentional murder ahead of time and decided to proceed
with the act. The argument that this juvenile is incorrigible is slightly
stronger than it would be for lesser offenses since in planning out a
murder, through premeditation and deliberation, the juvenile might be
susceptible to the penological justification of deterrence.
But youth is still a mitigating factor under the Miller factors, and
premeditation and deliberation do not necessarily infer an inability to
be rehabilitated. The potential for rehabilitation will have to be
Miller, 567 U.S. at 490–91 (Breyer, J., concurring); Keller, supra note 136, at 307.
Miller, 567 U.S. at 492 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S.
48, 69 (2010)).
142 Felony Murder, supra note 135.
143 See Miller, 567 U.S. at 490–91 (Breyer, J., concurring).
144 40 AM. JUR. 2D Homicide § 38 (2008); First-Degree Murder, LEGAL INFO. INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/first_degree_murder (last visited Sept. 30, 2021);
First-Degree Murder, JUSTIA, https://www.justia.com/criminal/offenses/homicide/firstdegree-murder/ (last updated Oct. 2021).
145 First-Degree Murder, JUSTIA, supra note 144.
140
141
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determined on a case-by-case basis. Because juveniles are different in
their ability to mature and change, anything less than evidence that a
murder was perpetrated with premeditation and deliberation should
not receive the harshest punishment a juvenile can obtain in the United
States. Limiting JLWOP sentences to first-degree murder charges
appropriately puts a procedural limit on a judge’s and prosecutor’s
discretion to seek the sentence.
V. STATES SHOULD CONSTRUE FIRST-DEGREE MURDER STATUTES NARROWLY
But problems can arise with the argument that limiting JLWOP to
first-degree murder charged individuals is an effective procedural limit.
First, some states statutorily define first-degree murder broadly to
include felony murder and accomplice murder.146
Second,
premeditation and deliberation may still be too lax of a standard to
justify a sentence of JLWOP after taking into account juvenile brain
development, which diminishes penological justifications. Thus, firstdegree murder charges should be limited even more narrowly to create
a heightened standard not in tension with the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition on excessive sanctions. When considering JLWOP sentences
for first-degree murder charges, first-degree murder should be defined
narrowly as a homicide committed with premeditation and
deliberation—similar to Pennsylvania’s narrow first-degree murder
statute and dissimilar to Michigan’s broad statute.147 In addition to a
finding of premeditation and deliberation, there should be a second
finding of deliberate and intentional cruelty before a sentence of JLWOP
is considered. This will be discussed below in Section A.
Narrowing what constitutes first-degree murder would serve
several functions with regards to JLWOP sentencing, discussed below in
Sections B, C, D, and E. First, it would help states with backlogged
resentencing procedures by limiting the pool of offenders for which
prosecutors may seek JLWOP. Second, it would take away discretion
from a judge or jury to determine if a child who lacks premeditation and
deliberation is (or is not) incorrigible, leading to more uniform
sentences for similarly situated defendants. Third, it would be
consistent with developing juvenile brain science, evidencing most
juveniles have a unique ability to mature and change.148 And finally, it
would be consistent with Supreme Court precedent, as showcased by
146 See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.316 (West 2014); see also LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:30
(West 2015).
147 See discussion supra Section III.B.
148 See discussion supra Section IV.A.
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the Court categorically prohibiting capital punishment for certain
offenses, and advances the Miller Court’s notion that JLWOP should be
uncommon since it is now the harshest sentence a juvenile can receive
in the United States.
A. Deliberate and Intentional Cruelty Standard
Before asking whether a juvenile charged with intentional murder
is incorrigible or not, a threshold question should consider whether the
nature of the crime committed is severe enough for a JLWOP sentence
to be recommended. JLWOP should only be available for those charged
with first-degree murder who showcased premeditation and
deliberation and deliberate and intentional cruelty in the execution of the
offense. This diminishes the risk of excessive sanctions since
prosecutors must comply with additional procedural checkpoints
before recommending JLWOP. For juveniles charged with first-degree
murder who showcased particular, deliberate cruelty in the commission
of a heinous murder, the penological justification of deterrence can
arguably be satisfied, making JLWOP a proportionate sentence for
juveniles in accordance with the Eighth Amendment. This heightened
standard could make JLWOP particularly uncommon, but this would be
consistent with the Court’s opinion in Miller that the sentence should be
reserved for the “rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable
corruption.”149
In retaining JLWOP and not categorically banning it, some juveniles
may be deterred from committing especially heinous crimes.150
Specifically, if there is evidence of a juvenile offender extensively
thinking about committing a homicide, deterrence may play a role in his
decision of whether or not to follow through with it. In other instances,
where a juvenile commits a murder quickly without consideration—like
for second degree or felony murder, discussed above—deterrence may
not play a role in that impulsive decision. Since “juveniles are
149 Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479–80 (2012) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543
U.S. 551, 573 (2005); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010)).
150 See id. at 480 (“[W]e do not foreclose a sentencer’s ability to make that
[incorrigibility] judgment.”); Natalie Pifer, Is Life the Same as Death?: Implications of
Graham v. Florida, Roper v. Simmons, and Atkins v. Virginia on Life Without Parole
Sentences for Juvenile and Mentally Retarded Offenders, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1495, 1517
(2010) (“[T]he Court’s deterrence analysis, weighted against an offender’s ‘moral
responsibility,’ would almost certainly be altered by the increased severity of homiciderelated offenses.”); THOMAS A. LOUGHRAN ET AL., JUVENILE JUSTICE BULLETIN: STUDYING
DETERRENCE AMONG HIGH-RISK ADOLESCENTS 12 (Off. of Juv. Just. and Delinq. Prevention ed.,
2015), https://ojjdp.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh176/files/pubs/248617.pdf (“Even
within a group of serious juvenile offenders, the certainty of punishment can play an
important role in deterring future crime.”).
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particularly susceptible to negative influences, and . . . long-term
consequential effects are not fully ingrained in the juvenile mind[,]” this
diminishes the effects of deterrence as applied to them.151 But while
juveniles are less susceptible to deterrence when compared to adults,
some juveniles may still be susceptible under such unique and limited
heinous circumstances, making them dangerous enough to argue they
should be incapacitated for life.152
The Court in Miller presumably concluded that deterrence was an
applicable penological justification, in rare cases, by declining to
categorically ban discretionary JLWOP.153 If deterrence was not a valid
penological justification, JLWOP sentences would likely be in tension
with the Eighth Amendment as a disproportionate punishment.
Another penological justification is retribution, or evaluating the
blameworthiness of these juveniles, which may also be considered.154
Juveniles are still blameworthy for their acts, but not as much as adults,
and only when their acts can be considered deliberately cruel would
they deserve the harshest punishment available to them.155 This would
require a holistic examination of the facts of the case.
Once the nature of a juvenile’s crime is considered, and if the
prosecution shows extensive premeditation and deliberation and
deliberate and intentional cruelty in the commission of the homicide,
only then would the question become whether there is evidence that the
juvenile is incorrigible. A first-degree murder with evidence of
premeditation and deliberation does not necessarily presume
incorrigibility—particularly in a developing child. Anything less than a
distinct finding of deliberate cruelty suggests that immaturity fueled the
commission of the crime rather than incorrigibility.
151 Charles Garabedian, Juvenile Empiricism: Approaches to Juvenile Sentencing in
Light of Graham and Miller, 21 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 195, 210 (2017); see also Katz
et al., supra note 118; Streib & Schrempp, supra note 115, at 4–6.
152 Pifer, supra note 150; Moin A. Yahya, Deterring Roper’s Juveniles: Using A Law and
Economics Approach to Show That the Logic of Roper Implies That Juveniles Require the
Death Penalty More than Adults, 111 PENN. ST. L. REV. 53, 53–54 (2006).
153 Miller, 567 U.S. at 480 (“Although we do not foreclose a sentencer’s ability to make
that [incorrigibility] judgment in homicide cases, we require it to take into account how
children are different, and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing
them to a lifetime in prison.”).
154 Graham, 560 U.S. at 71 (“‘The heart of the retribution rationale is that a criminal
sentence must be directly related to the personal culpability of the criminal offender.’
. . . Roper found that ‘[r]etribution is not proportional if the law’s most severe penalty is
imposed’ on the juvenile murderer.”) (internal citations omitted).
155 See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 208 (2016); Miller, 567 U.S. at 472
(“[A]ttributes of youth diminish penological justifications for imposing the harshest
sentence on juvenile offenders, even when they commit terrible crimes.”); Pifer, supra
note 150, at 1517.
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Some examples of murder that exhibit deliberate cruelty include
“murder . . . committed by means of a destructive device, bomb, or
explosive . . . [that] the defendant knew . . . would create a great risk of
death” or multiple deaths, a murder that manifested “a conscienceless
or pitiless crime that [was] unnecessarily torturous to the victim,” or the
deliberate murder of a child.156 By contrast, examples of murder that do
not exhibit deliberate cruelty include murder committed in the heat of
the moment,157 murder committed because of a lack of intellect leading
to an inability to appreciate consequences,158 or murder committed
without planning. Judges may be guided by determining whether the
murder was carried out in a manner that indicates a strong and
calculated desire to bring about the victim’s, or multiple victims’, deaths,
as well as by considering the defendant’s youth, level of maturity, and
social factors that affected his decision. Even in circumstances in which
a juvenile displays premeditation and deliberation and deliberate
cruelty, juveniles have such a capacity for change that JLWOP may still
be unjustified, depending on the facts of the case and the evidence
presented.159 Applying these narrowed definitions and threshold
questions before entertaining the possibility of JLWOP diminishes the
risk of excessive sanctions by creating procedural checkpoints with
which a prosecutor must comply.
B. Recommendation Positively Impacts Resentencing Procedures
Considering how a juvenile has perpetrated the narrowed firstdegree murder charge will limit the availability of JLWOP and aid some
states with their backlogged resentencing procedures. Prosecutors

156 CAL. PENAL CODE §190.2 (West 2019); see United States v. Tsarnaev, 968 F.3d 24,
79 (1st Cir. 2020). Taking into account the number of victims, number of injured,
extensive premeditation and planning of the bombing, and motivation for the attack, if
the Boston Marathon bomber was under the age of eighteen at the time of the bombings,
under this standard, he should still be subject to JLWOP. He was nineteen years old and
eligible for the death penalty. See also Columbine Shooting, HISTORY.COM (Mar. 4, 2021)
https://www.history.com/topics/1990s/columbine-high-school-shootings.
The
Columbine High School Massacre shooters were eighteen and seventeen years old and
killed thirteen people.
157 Brief for Petitioner at 3, Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307 (2021) (No. 18-1259)
(Fifteen-year-old Brett “‘had a steak knife in his hand from making [the] sandwich’ and
‘he “threw the knife forward,” stabbing his grandfather.’”).
158 Commonwealth v. Batts, 163 A.3d 410, 424 (Pa. 2017) (“Batts’ ‘level of
sophistication[,] which was not very high,’ also affected his ability to make a sound
decision. While seemingly streetwise, Batts’ judgment was clouded by the idea of ‘being
part of a crowd’ and gaining acceptance. . . . Batts was of an entirely different mindset
because of his age and the ‘horrible environment’ from whence he came.”) (internal
citations omitted).
159 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005).
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would not have the ability to re-recommend JLWOP for those convicted
of less than first-degree murder, which could alleviate some of the
delays courts have been experiencing, like in Michigan. Prosecutors
would have to evaluate the circumstances and nature of the juvenile
lifer’s crime, and if it seems unlikely the crime was committed with
deliberate and intentional cruelty, they would be less likely to rerecommend JLWOP.
Alleviating backlogs of resentencing is especially relevant in
response to calls to decrease prison population density because of
COVID-19.160 Though resentencing procedures should not be rushed, it
is important to be cognizant of how fast (or how slow) a state allows
resentencing and it is equally important to hold these states accountable
for unnecessarily detaining individuals entitled to resentencing. And
since mandatory JLWOP sentences have been held unconstitutional,
juvenile lifers are entitled to resentencing. But some states have been
either unwilling or unable to give these lifers their guaranteed
resentencing hearing.161 States should be proactively alleviating these
resentencing delays, not actively contributing to them.
C. Recommendation Helps Relieve Current Problems with Defining
Incorrigibility
This recommendation, imploring states to narrowly tailor what
constitutes first-degree murder, will also take away discretion from a
judge or jury to determine if an offender who lacks premeditation and
deliberation is incorrigible, leading to more uniform sentences for
similarly situated juvenile defendants. Though the Court has specified
in both Miller and Montgomery that a sentence of JLWOP should be
reserved for the rarest of individuals,162 the Court has not defined what
evidence would support a finding of incorrigibility or “provide[d]
guidelines for identifying the exceptionally rare juvenile who is eligible
for life without parole.”163 Without any instruction on how to apply the
Miller factors, “courts are unable to apply them consistently in any fair
way.”164
Incorrigibility itself is an imprecise and variable determination,
“difficult even for expert psychologists to differentiate between the
juvenile offender whose crime reflects unfortunate yet transient
Hager, supra note 67.
Id.
162 Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 208 (2016); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S.
460, 479–80 (2012).
163 Hoesterey, supra note 13, at 182.
164 Id.
160
161
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immaturity, and the rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects
irreparable corruption.”165 But employing a deliberate and intentional
cruelty standard regarding the nature of a juvenile’s crime, explained
above, will require prosecutors to provide more evidence as to the
nature and circumstances of the crime and the juvenile’s mental state
and planning of the homicide. This presumably would make it less likely
that a juvenile would be considered incorrigible unless there were
sufficient facts to prove it. Conversely, those juveniles who did not
showcase deliberate and intentional cruelty would not be subject to the
finding of incorrigibility; thus, JLWOP would not have been an
appropriate sentence in the first place, reaffirming the notion that
“incorrigibility is inconsistent with youth.”166
D. Recommendation is Consistent with Juvenile Brain Science
The deliberate and intentional cruelty standard is consistent with
juvenile brain science, evidencing that most juveniles have prospects for
reform.167 The recommended standard affords more protection than
the current law surrounding JLWOP, making it less likely that juveniles
would be considered for the sentence without meeting the heightened
procedural safeguards. Though there is an argument to be made that no
juvenile is incapable of being rehabilitated,168 since as time passes and
neurological development occurs most deficiencies will be reformed,
there may be outliers or the “rare juvenile offender whose crime reflects
irreparable corruption.”169 Though juveniles are less culpable than
adults for sentencing purposes, they may still be culpable; those
juveniles who extensively and deliberately plan a homicide may be
eventually deterred by knowing JLWOP may await them if they follow
through.
E. Recommendation is Consistent with Precedent
The Court has categorically prohibited capital punishment for
certain classes of offenses in the past, requiring state death penalty
statutes to narrow the categories of murders for which capital
punishment is available.170 The Court has also categorically prohibited
JLWOP for charges that do not involve a homicide, holding it a

165 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005) (citing Steinberg & Scott, supra note
132, at 1014–16).
166 Miller, 567 U.S. at 473 (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 72–73 (2010)).
167 Id. at 471 (citing Graham, 560 U.S. at 68); see discussion supra Section IV.A.
168 See Hoesterey, supra note 13, at 181–83.
169 Miller, 567 U.S. at 479–80 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 573; Graham, 560 U.S. at 68).
170 Roper, 543 U.S. at 568; Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
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disproportionate punishment in those cases.171
Categorically
prohibiting the imposition of JLWOP for certain degrees of crimes is
consistent with this line of precedent, with the understanding that it is
a disproportionate punishment for all but narrowed first-degree
murder. This recommendation also reaffirms and is consistent with the
general reasoning in Miller that JLWOP should be uncommon since it is
now the harshest sentence a juvenile can receive in the United States.
On April 22, 2021, the Court held in Jones v. Mississippi that the
Eighth Amendment does not require a sentencing authority to make a
finding that a juvenile is permanently incorrigible before imposing a
sentence of JLWOP.172 The Court asserted this opinion did not disturb
Miller or Montgomery, though Justice Sotomayor provided a powerful
dissent challenging the majority’s application of stare decisis.173 Since
the Court held that a finding of incorrigibility is not needed despite the
Court’s precedent of Miller and Montgomery, this Comment’s
recommendation may be even more important. If a finding of
incorrigibility is not needed before sentencing a juvenile to JLWOP,
creating a further limit on imposing JLWOP is even more necessary
because state disparities in sentencing will continue to go unchecked,
and juveniles who likely have the capacity for rehabilitation will not be
protected from the then-excessive sentence of JLWOP. Judges and juries
in the minority of states that do not require a finding of incorrigibility
now have the discretion to simply consider the Miller factors, without a
presumption against JLWOP and without an explicit understanding of
how youth itself diminishes penological justifications to all but the
rarest of offenders who commit the rarest of offenses. Implementing a
heightened procedural safeguard that sentencers must comply with
would mitigate these risks.
VI. CONCLUSION
Imposing a categorical ban on JLWOP for those charged with less
than a narrowed definition of first-degree murder will serve several
functions. First, it will help states with backed-up resentencing
procedures by limiting the pool of JLWOP sentences a prosecutor can
Graham, 560 U.S. at 74.
Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307, 1311 (2021).
173 Id. at 1328 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Today, however, the Court reduces Miller
to a decision requiring ‘just a discretionary sentencing procedure where youth [is]
considered.’ Such an abrupt break from precedent demands ‘special justification.’ The
Court offers none. Instead, the Court attempts to circumvent stare decisis principles by
claiming that ‘[t]he Court’s decision today carefully follows both Miller and
Montgomery.’ The Court is fooling no one. Because I cannot countenance the Court’s
abandonment of Miller and Montgomery, I dissent.”) (internal citations omitted).
171
172
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seek. Second, it will take away discretion from a judge or jury to
determine if an offender who lacks premeditation and deliberation is
(or is not) incorrigible, or unable to be rehabilitated, leading to more
uniform sentences for similarly situated defendants. Third, it is
consistent with developing juvenile brain science, evidencing most
juveniles have a unique ability to mature and change. And finally, it is
supported by precedent—as showcased by the Court categorically
prohibiting capital punishment for certain offenses—and advances the
Miller Court’s notion that JLWOP should be uncommon since it is now
the harshest sentence a juvenile can receive in the United States.
Limiting how first-degree murder should be statutorily defined by
requiring a showing of premeditation and deliberation and deliberate
cruelty in the execution of the crime further protects juveniles and
prohibits states from justifying the imposition of JLWOP sentences
broadly. Children are different in their ability to mature and change and
should not be subjected to the harshest penalty available to them in the
United States unless a prosecutor can effectively comply with this
heightened standard.

